By Dimitris Kouvaras,
Shock and awe are two words that aptly describe the first impressions of D.J. Trump’s second administration, both on the home and external fronts. Showcasing unprecedented contempt for convention, unbothered self-conviction and a fair share of political audacity, the new executive has had a dynamic start in propagating and implementing the agenda Trump outlined in his inaugural address on January 20th. Right after leaping into power, the Republican president produced a torrent of executive orders affecting numerous federal agencies, pardoning the usurpers of January 8th, and infringing on constitutional provisions such as birth-right citizenship.
Meanwhile, his administration has caused a stir in foreign relations, especially those with Europe, with former mutual allegiance being tested after vice president Vance’s Munich Security Conference speech on February 14th, that amounted to an outright attack on European values. As for the Gaza conflict, Trump’s plans for an American appropriation of the strip and mass population displacement have caused unease if not worry. As these examples attest, a big shift in course is taking place in America, whose abruptness leaves the rest of the world struggling to keep pace. By examining certain key acts of the new administration in this article, I will try to outline its agenda’s political and ideological axes and ponder their global ramifications.
Starting with the inaugural address, Trump was the first president since William McKinley in 1987 to directly discuss the expansion of the U.S. territory to fulfil America’s destiny as a “growing nation”. Devouring what was left of the Spanish Empire, McKinley enlarged the U.S. with the addition of Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Now Trump claims the Panama Canal and Greenland for national security reasons, although one can speculate that the economic advantage of controlling a passage for 5% of global trade and Greenland’s invaluable minerals and rare earths also played a role in the claim. In line with this argument, the economic component of Trump’s foreign policy is paramount, with tariff proclamations on imported goods reaching 25% in the cases of Mexico and Canada and 10% against China.
Although they have yet to take effect, these measures belie a protectionist policy of economic nationalism aimed at boosting the local industry and generating national income while evading tax increases on the wealthy. This policy course contradicts the post-war championing of free trade by the U.S., and can be likened to America’s interwar economic isolationism. Meanwhile, the geographical concentration of Trump’s territorial claims and heaviest tariff targets suggests a regionalist foreign policy of domination in the northern Americas, one that could be interpreted as an inverted and reinvented version of the Monroe Doctrine.
Therefore, Trump’s new foreign policy seems to be closer to that of the 19th century and the interwar period than to post-war American foreign policy. His withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, his affinities with Putin and his reluctance towards aiding Ukraine stave off the Russian invasion, as well as his threat to abandon European NATO allies lest they meet the 2% military spending target all point to a non-globalist approach that prioritises national interest over international commitment. Trump’s withdrawal from international institutions including the World Health Organisation and the funding of the United Nations Human Rights Council seems oddly familiar with the American’s reluctance to join the League of Nations in 1919. This signals a huge shift from America’s role as a “leader of the free world” and prime exporter of liberal institutions, which started as a counterweight to Communism following the Second World War and continued into its unipolar global predominance in the 1990s.
By contrast, Trump seems to endorse the reality of a multipolar international system, combined with a Darwinian view of international relations. In that context, he tries to bolster economic and territorial defences, making sure that America is the strongest one in the game. Having ensured this, he is prepared to accommodate with the other poles, not least Russia as it seems. The loser in this game appears to be Europe, whose defence had always counted on the American gendarme and whose liberal ideas found fertile ground in the global institutions sponsored by Washington. However, as Vance’s speech manifested, these days are over.
Although addressed mainly to European leaders in the fashion of a breakup note, the Munich speech has more to say about the political tactics of the Trump administration on the home front. Vance accused European democracy of “running in fear of [its] voters” along the lines of the American free speech doctrine, blaming the European legislation targeted against hateful speech and ultranationalist discourse for silencing the voices of the people. His mantra that “each of our citizens has wisdom and has a voice” is a testament to the anti-woke populism inherent in the Trump administration and directed to its MAGA followers. Scornful of institutional avenues and legal concerns, the administration tries to establish a direct relationship with its partisan following and polarise it against the liberal establishment by deeming the latter elitist, so it can present itself as an incarnation of the following’s wishes. Trump’s pardoning of the January 8th usurpers is a prime example of populist partisan politics, and so is the announcement of federal agency shutdowns by Elon Musk through his X account before any official political channels. Such measures target a host of liberal federal institutions, including USAID and the Department of Education, following the line of the executive orders terminating federal diversity and inclusion programmes.
As for Musk’s role in the executive, he was made head of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), a newly founded agency aimed at fiscally limiting federal bureaucracy to save money for tax cuts yet effectively dismantling liberal institutions and exercising wide budgetary and personnel controls by forcing thousands of federal employees to temporary leave and possibly redundancy. However, Musk has not been formally appointed as an “officer” of the United States “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate” as per the Constitution, nor DOGE has been instituted by Congress law, which creates questions of constitutionality and violation of the separation of powers by Trump’s executive.
As Congress is weakened by partisan division, Trump seems to be paving the way for an imperial presidency, testing to which extent the executive’s functions can expand over those of the legislative and be tolerated by the judiciary. Against this infringement, the courts are the main bulwark in the constitutional design of checks and balances. Already dozens of lawsuits have been filed against Trump’s measures, and some injunctions have already been ordered by federal judges, as in the case of birth-right citizenship and DOGE access to treasury data. Nevertheless, the struggle is by no means over given the conservative composition of the current Supreme Court and its lack of practical enforcement mechanisms.
Overall, the first month of Trump’s presidency was full of developments in both foreign and domestic policy. Foreign policy was redesigned with territorial economic nationalism championing global liberalism. Meanwhile, domestic politics were based on populism and a tour de force by the executive government branch. As a gloomy era begins for America, those who have an interest in maintaining the liberal order must respond now. Americans are called to protest power abuse and show their support for the rulings of justice, while global leaders are called to adjust to the new status quo in their relations with Washington. Europe, especially, should not allow itself to be bullied. Without severing ties with the U.S., it must stay convicted of its values yet reassess its international interests considering the changing circumstances. If global politics turns Darwinian, it cannot afford to be at the bottom of the chain.
References
- America has an imperial presidency.The Economist. Available here
- US judges bar Musk’s DOGE from Treasury, allow access to health, labor. Reuters. Available here
- Doe v. Musk Complaint. Case No. 25 cv-00462-TDC. February 13th, 202. Available here
- Read: JD Vance’s full speech on the fall of Europe. The Spectator. Available here
- US: The danger of an imperial presidency. Le Monde. Available here
- America has an imperial presidency. The Economist. Available here
